中日峰会的原因与驱动力

迈克尔•格林 美国战略与国际研究中心副主席、日本项目主任、前国家安全委员会亚洲部部长  2014年11月10日

【摘要】 日本最终并没有满足中国提出的习安会的两个条件。中日两国领导人都需要会晤。如果习近平在APEC会议期间不同安倍晋三进行会晤的话,作为一场旨在改善地区合作的峰会,这会让他看起来显得不够大气。北京方面谋求孤立日本的战略除了韩国以外已经基本失败。对安倍而言,他需要继续聚焦经济复苏,改善中日关系能够增强美日同盟中的信心。


11月10日,日本首相安倍晋三和中国国家主席习近平在亚太经合组织领导人非正式会议期间举行双边会晤。尽管两位领导人间的会晤应当是理所当然的,尤其在双方经济相互依赖以及地缘政治紧张关系持续的背景下更是如此,但中国方面一直拒绝和安倍晋三进行会晤。两位领导人的首次正式会谈并没有消除中日之间存在的所有潜在问题,但此次会面确实向中国国内各层级官员释放了一个明确的信号:同日本的接触是必要的。这也许将能够为中日之间更加透明的关系以及中日建立互信机制带来更大的机会。

直到现在北京方面都坚持习安峰会需要满足两大条件:第一,安倍晋三公开宣称不再参拜靖国神社;第二,承认中日在钓鱼岛存在争议。安倍本人不会满足第一个条件,这主要是基于政治和个人考量;日本政府不会满足第二个条件因为他们坚持认为钓鱼岛无可争议是日本的领土,不存在所谓的“争议”(这和英国在福克兰群岛以及大部分国际争端中各方的观点是类似的)。东京方面尤其不希望在中国方面对钓鱼岛持续施压的背景下承认这些争议,因为这可能会释放日本示弱的信号,这将影响到整个西太平洋地区。

北京方面最终没有实现这两点中的任何一点。对第一点而言,11月7日中日联合声明宣布,双方本着“正视历史、面向未来”的精神就克服影响两国关系政治障碍达成一些共识,这给了两国向国内民众进行解释的空间。这是否表示日本方面明确表示不会参拜靖国神社还不清楚。我个人不认为这是一个非黑即白的声明,但大部分的日本问题分析人士都认为安倍不会在近期参拜靖国神社,因为安倍已经在任期的第一年参拜了靖国神社,满足了个人的愿望,这样的信息应该也已经传递给了中国方面。就第二点而言,这几乎无人怀疑。安倍并没有屈服于中国直接承认钓鱼岛存在主权争议。安倍晋三和习近平“承认双方就包括钓鱼岛在内的东海紧张局势有不同观点”。这是非常巧妙的表态,日方并没有直接承认钓鱼岛存在主权争议,但是中国方面可以认为日本在公开宣示的政策上出现了一些新的论调。

中日两国领导人都需要会晤。如果习近平在APEC会议期间不同安倍晋三进行会晤的话,作为一场旨在改善地区合作的峰会,这会让他看起来显得不够大气。日本向中国的投资已经开始向东南亚国家转移,这也让中国领导人担忧本国已经走低的经济增速。最后,北京方面谋求孤立日本的战略除了韩国以外已经基本失败,安倍晋三已经在两年的旋风式外交中同外国领导人进行了超过100场会晤。对安倍而言,他需要继续聚焦经济复苏,改善中日关系能够增强美日同盟中的信心。现在华盛顿和东京方面正就防卫指针增进对这一地区的威慑力进行协调。日本前首相福田康夫也在改善中日关系方面做出了重要的贡献。

习安会是否标志着东海紧张局势将发生改变、中国对钓鱼岛附近海域的海空侦查是否会减少以使得外交能够推进都仍有待观察。构建基于互利的战略伙伴关系需要更多的行为,而不仅仅是巧妙的言辞。不过,这是一个开端。


 

 

Xi Meets Abe: Skillful Diplomacy but Tensions Remain


Michael Green


On November 10, 2014, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan and President Xi Jinping of China held a bilateral meeting on the margins of APEC in Beijing. Though a summit meeting between these two Asian giants should be a matter of course given their economic interdependence and rising geopolitical tensions, the Chinese side had refused to meet Abe until now. The two leaders’ first official exchange in person does not eliminate underlying problems in Sino-Japanese relations, but it does send the signal throughout the Chinese system that engagement with Tokyo is necessary — and this might in turn open greater opportunities for transparency and confidence-building.

 

Until now Beijing had adamantly demanded two conditions for a summit. The first was that Abe publicly commit to not visiting the controversial Yasukuni Shrine; the second was that he admit the existence of a dispute with China over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Abe would not do the first for political and personal reasons and the Japanese government would not do the second because it maintains that the Senkakus are irrefutably Japanese sovereign territory and therefore no “dispute” exists to speak of (a position identical to Britain’s position on the Falklands and most other similar international situations). Tokyo was particularly loathe to concede these points under Chinese pressure around the Senkakus, since that would send a signal of weakness that would affect the entire Western Pacific.

 

Beijing ultimately did not receive what it claimed to demand on either condition. On the first condition, a November 7 joint Sino-Japanese statement declared that both sides were “facing history squarely and looking forward to the future,” which provided room for each side to interpret the outcome as necessary for domestic audiences. Whether there was an explicit Japanese pledge not to visit Yasukuni is unclear. I doubt it was black and white, but most informed observers in Tokyo do expect that Abe will not visit the shrine in the near future having fulfilled his personal desire to do so in his first year in office and perhaps this was conveyed. On the second Chinese condition, however, there can be little doubt: Abe did not cave to the demand that he acknowledge a sovereignty dispute. Instead, Abe and Xi agreed to “recognize that the two countries hold a different view over the tense situation in the East China Sea, including those around the Senkaku Islands.” This was a skillful formulation that did not acknowledge a legal dispute about the sovereignty of the islands, but did allow the Chinese side to point to some new tone in Japanese declaratory policy.

 

Both leaders had reasons to want a summit. Xi would have looked petty to other leaders if he had refused to meet Abe while hosting an APEC summit designed to improve cooperation in the region. The diversion of Japanese foreign direct investment from China to Southeast Asia has also alarmed Chinese officials concerned about lower growth rates at home. Finally, Beijing’s strategy to isolate Abe has largely failed outside of South Korea, since the Prime Minister has held successful summits with over 100 world leaders in two years of whirlwind diplomacy. For his part, Abe needs to maintain a focus on economic recovery and recognizes that reassuring moves with Beijing help build confidence in the U.S.-Japan alliance as Washington and Tokyo revise Defense Guidelines to strengthen deterrence in the region. Former Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda also deserves credit for changing the tone in bilateral relations with his frequent visits to China.

 

The test of whether the Abe-Xi meeting really marks a change in East China Sea tensions, of course lies ahead. Will Chinese maritime incursions and aerial overflights around the Senkakus abate so that diplomacy can proceed on firm ground? Building a “strategic relationship of mutual benefit” will take much more than crafty language. But this is a start.



 
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